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Abstract: Resistance to the idea that non-human animals are sentient resembles
erstwhile resistance to the theory that the earth is not the centre of the universe, or
that humans evolved from “apes”. All these notions are psychologically threatening.
They can remind people of their own creatureliness and mortality and might make
them feel guilty or uncertain about their way of life. An honest debate over animal
sentience, welfare and rights should consider the human motivation to deprive
animals of these things in the first place. I briefly review empirical evidence on the
psychological function of denying animal minds.
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Introduction. The null hypothesis about animal sentience -- and hence the burden of proving
otherwise -- could just as well have been that all animals are sentient. It is not by chance that
western societies have been historically debating whether they should grant to nonhuman
animals the desired qualities of sentience, intelligence, and deservingness of basic rights
(Rowan et al., 2021). We humans are motivated to feel qualitatively different from and
superior to all other animals (Chapman & Huffman, 2018). We have a lot to lose by agreeing
to an equal playing field. But it’s not just greed, apathy or guilt that is driving our negativity
towards animals. The mere idea that we are potentially no different from a lizard or a ladybug
strikes at the very core of our existence.
Empirical research documenting the human motivation for devaluing and harming
animals has been guided by several psychological perspectives (for reviews see Dhont et al.,
2019; Dhont & Hodson, 2019). Two theories that have been directly applied to try to explain
this phenomenon are terror management theory (TMT: Greenberg et al., 1986) and cognitive
dissonance theory (CDT: Festinger, 1957).
Terror management theory (TMT). TMT (Greenberg et al., 1986; Solomon et al., 2015) was
inspired by the work of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (1973), who argued that much
of human behavior is directed at the denial of death. According to TMT, because humans
(unlike other animals, as far as we know) are aware of their mortality, they can experience
potentially debilitating anxiety when reminded of death. To manage this anxiety, humans
subscribe to cultural worldviews that allow them to perceive themselves as valuable members
of a meaningful universe, and provide them with hopes of literal and symbolic immortality if
they follow culturally prescribed standards of value.
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As it is our animal-like body that dies, transcending death (in most western cultures) requires
some degree of disassociation from both animals and the physical body (Becker, 1975;
Goldenberg et al., 2000). Goldenberg et al (2001) found that reminders of death (but not
other aversive topics) heightened disgust responses to images of human body products as
well as to images of animals. They also increased preference for essays highlighting the
differences (rather than the similarities) between humans and other animals.
Tracy et al. (2011) found that reminders of death made participants more inclined to
reject Darwin’s theory of human evolution, regardless of religiosity, educational background,
or preexisting attitudes. Other studies have reported that thinking about human-animal
similarities can increase the accessibility of death-related thoughts to consciousness (e.g., Cox
et al., 2007) and that individuals who generally perceive themselves as more similar to
animals have higher trait anxiety and existential concerns (Lifshin et al., 2021).
To feel powerful and protected from death, people not only need to disassociate
themselves from animals but to assert their superiority to them. Thinking that we are the only
sentient or intelligent creature (Plous, 2003; Chapman & Huffman 2018) reflects just that.
Soenke et al. (2018) examined the psychological function of belief in human intellectual
superiority over animals. Reminders of death were found to increase negative reactions to a
scientific article describing dolphins as more intelligent than humans. Reading the article was
also found to increase thoughts about death. Reminders of death can also increase negative
attitudes toward animals (Beatson & Halloran, 2007; Beatson et al., 2009; for reviews, see
Marino, & Mountain, 2015, 2021; Lifshin & Greenberg, 2019). Lifshin et al. (2017) found that
even subliminal reminders of death (presented too fast to be consciously perceived)
increased support for killing animals in various domains, which was in turn associated with an
increased sense of power and invulnerability.
Cognitive dissonance theory (CDT). According to CDT (Festinger, 1957), people are motivated
to try to reduce inconsistencies (dissonance) among their cognitions (regarding attitudes,
values, or behaviors). They do this by changing one of the contradictory cognitions, adding
cognitions that resolve the inconsistency, or trivializing the inconsistency altogether. People
are motivated to justify their past and current behavior so as to reduce feelings of dissonance
or guilt, especially when the behavior might have negative consequences for one’s selfesteem (e.g., Stone & Cooper, 2001; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Harmon-Jones,
2017). Because humans have long been mistreating and abusing animals, they are motivated
to justify this continuing exploitation by denying that animals have minds or deserve empathy.
This is very much like the dehumanization of human targets of human aggression (Bandura et
al., 1975).
Experiments by Bastian et al. (2012) have found that reminding people of their meateating practices and how it harms animals increases the tendency to deny that the animals
they eat have intelligence and other “higher” mental capacities (the meat paradox; see also
Leach et al., 2022). Martens et al (2007; Martens & Kosloff, 2012) report that having people
engage in a (bogus) bug-killing task increases the eagerness with which they kill bugs in a
subsequent bug-killing task. This effect is stronger among individuals reporting greater
perceived similarity to animals, presumably because they feel more guilty about having killed
them, and are more motivated to reduce dissonance by doubling-down on their past
behavior. It is nevertheless also true that stronger identification with animals has been found
to be associated with positive attitudes towards them (Amiot & Bastian, 2017; Serpell, 2004).
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Conclusion. Empirical evidence indicates that people’s way of thinking about animals is
motivated. Research on TMT and CDT suggests that the human tendency to disassociate from
and devalue animals serves a protective psychological function. An impartial philosophical,
scientific, or legal debate over the subject of animal sentience, intelligence, welfare, or rights
should take such cognitive factors explicitly into consideration.
Understanding these human motives may eventually help reduce negativity towards
animals. For example, boosting alternative anxiety buffers such as attachment-security or
self-esteem may help reduce human apathy or aggression toward animals (e.g., Lifshin et al.
2017.). Promoting pro-animal values and laws could set new standards for the sense of selfworth, and may reverse the effects that reminders of death have on attitudes towards
animals (e.g., Lifshin et al., 2022). Declarations and legislation acknowledging animal
sentience and protecting welfare, such as those reviewed in Rowan et al.’s target article may
yet prove important and effective.
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